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Executive summary 
S1. In 2010, the ministers of defence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a Letter 
of Intent (LoI), stating their wish to extend trilateral Baltic collaboration to the field of 
defence-related research and technology (R&T). They resolved to pursue collaborative 
R&T projects and programmes in order to support the development of military 
capabilities and organisations and the conduct of military operations. This intent to build 
synergies between the three national defence-related R&T programmes was entirely 
congruent with the context of broader trends within the EU and NATO such as the desire 
for more ‘pooling and sharing’ between member states and for stronger regional 
defence cooperation, including in R&T. However, the ministerial will has to be translated 
into more specific policies and actions to launch and sustain trilateral collaboration in 
this field.  
S2. This ICDS Policy Paper seeks to generate ideas on how the Baltic states could 
advance their collaboration in defence-related R&T. It explores and compares the 
current state of affairs in their national defence-related R&T sectors and identifies 
various obstacles and opportunities. These, in turn, define what is possible, feasible and 
necessary in fostering close collaboration and what levels of ambition, directions and 
‘business models’ the Baltic states can realistically pursue. In doing so, the paper adopts 
a broad definition of R&T, which encompasses not only natural sciences and engineering 
but also social sciences and humanities, i.e. in addition to armaments and equipment 
R&T also pertains to organisational, doctrinal and human aspects of defence-related 
knowledge and innovation. 
S3. The paper outlines the broadly similar experiences of all three countries in their 
national defence-related R&T efforts over the last decade or so. The Baltic states 
conducted projects of similar nature and have a limited number of ‘success stories’ to 
boast with. Estonia is slightly ahead of Latvia and Lithuania in the development of its 
R&T strategy for its defence organisation and its implementation mechanisms. The same 
applies to funding, although none of the three countries have been able to meet the 
target of spending 2% of their defence budgets on R&T. All three countries largely rely 
on the civilian science and technology (S&T) sector as suppliers, with Latvia having the 
most advanced understanding of how its defence efforts can benefit from the civilian 
S&T. However, the defence industrial base in all three countries is virtually non-existent 
and mutual awareness of civilian S&T and military organisations is very limited. 
Furthermore, in-house R&T capacities and competences of the three defence 
organisations are very thin, thus hampering effective understanding of emerging 
technologies and capabilities, transactions with civilian S&T suppliers and successful 
utilisation of R&T outcomes. 
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S4. The paper demonstrates that the Baltic states eagerly participate in the activities 
of the NATO Research and Technology Organisation (RTO, soon to be renamed as 
Science and Technology Organisation, STO) because its ‘business model’ and the scale 
and nature of its projects are more attractive than those of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA), given the limited resources and ambitions of the Baltic states. The RTO 
area of human factors and medicine appears to be the field in which interests and 
involvement of all three countries are the most aligned. Trilateral collaboration in 
defence-related R&T is mostly confined to this field in the form of a trilateral 
‘community of practice’ of military medics, although regularly meeting military 
‘communities of practice’ in other fields could at least generate common requirements 
for R&T inputs. The Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) has occasionally served as a 
regional hub for knowledge exchange and as a meeting place for such communities, just 
like the now discontinued Baltic Defence R&T Conference, which the ministries of 
defence organised in the past. 
S5. The Baltic states must understand that there is a number of obstacles to their 
collaboration in defence-related R&T and that the obstacles need to be managed. The 
following obstacles were identified: (1) conceptual – there is a prevailing concept that 
R&T must be focused on technical issues and that its desired outcomes are field 
armaments and equipment; (2) cultural – there is no habit of drawing on S&T expertise 
in improving defence organisations and thus its relevance is often dismissed; (3) 
planning – advanced military capabilities are often poorly understood and there is a 
degree of instability of capability plans and requirements, which should form the basis 
for R&T requirements; (4) organisational – the Baltic states lack ‘knowledge brokering’ 
hubs (or centres of competence) and their defence structures do not have sufficient 
numbers of various specialists who could act as mediators between military end-users 
and civilian S&T suppliers; (5) legal – the application of public procurement laws could 
create problems if pan-Baltic suppliers of R&T products and services received 
preferential treatment; (6) political – there is a lack of enthusiasm for large trilateral 
collaboration initiatives plus a tendency towards more bilateral ties within the region; 
(7) human resources – the skills and qualities of those involved in defence-related R&T 
often do not command respect of important stakeholders; (8) financial – financial 
austerity and pressures on defence budgets make the acceptance of ambitious and 
expensive R&T collaboration programmes very unlikely. 
S6. At the same time, conversations with members of the three defence 
organisations and with representatives of the civilian S&T sector revealed a number of 
opportunities for trilateral collaboration. The opportunities present themselves, inter 
alia, in the following forms: an emerging interest in S&T foresight; the need to better 
understand new military capabilities pursued by NATO and the EU; an overlapping 
interest in how to improve the management of human resources in the military; a 
growing understanding at various levels of the dismal state of knowledge and 
technology management competences in the three defence organisations; and the 
eagerness of specialist military ‘communities of practice’ to develop their competences 
with the help of R&T. The high cost of some robotic solutions to specific military 
problems available on the international market and the need to manage legacy 
armaments and equipment were also seen as opportunities for joint R&T activities in at 
least two of the countries. Last but not least, the existing trilateral collaboration projects 
and organisations could generate some common ‘pull’ for R&T efforts to support their 
development and functioning (e.g. research in maritime mine countermeasures to 
support further evolution of BALTRON). 
S7. Subsequently, the paper suggests to limit the ambitions of trilateral defence 
collaboration in R&T and, first and foremost, to focus its agenda on the issues central to 
the military profession and military organisations such as theory, history, strategy, 
  
BALTIC COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE-RELATED R&T | Tomas Jermalavičius 
 
 
3 
operations, tactics, doctrine, leadership, etc. The paper argues that this focus could be 
supported by carefully chosen interdisciplinary themes that branch out into civilian S&T, 
with human factors and medicine, organisational management and modelling and 
simulation being the prime contenders, followed by such areas as C4ISR, information 
assurance, autonomous vehicle technology and electromagnetic spectrum technologies. 
Even in these areas, however, the paper cautions against too ambitious, risky and 
expensive pursuit of new products and services based on R&T, which would lead to the 
creation of new capabilities. The paper recommends that the Baltic states should rather 
collaborate in defence-related R&T with the purpose of building their capacities for S&T 
awareness, transactions with the civilian S&T sector and better absorption of R&T 
results. 
S8. The paper suggests that the most suitable ‘business model’ for the 
implementation of this approach, which would also reflect the very limited 
administrative capacities of the three defence organisations, would be to advance 
trilateral R&T collaboration by means of a BALTDEFCOL-led research consortium of 
national defence academies, mentored by a non-Baltic NATO/EU nation with significant 
experience in defence R&T. As the principal forum and the main channel for sharing the 
outputs of the consortium and for linking civilian S&T and military ‘communities of 
practice’ and end-users for collaboration purposes, the paper recommends the re-
launch of the Baltic Defence Research and Technology Conference as a biennial event, 
which should each time be preceded by a series of workshops and seminars run by 
thematic research task groups. It is also proposed to create a common database for 
sharing the results of the consortium and the information about national projects and 
R&T competences.  
S9. The paper concludes that although this approach does not directly correspond 
to the desires of the ministers to develop new military capabilities through R&T 
collaboration, it is far better suited to the present realities of the Baltic states. The 
approach is flexible and relatively low-cost. Over time, it will help to induce a culture of 
learning, experimentation and innovation in the three defence organisations and to 
build their technological competences, which are the prerequisites for intelligent 
acquisition, maintenance and use of military capabilities. 
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Introduction 
1.  This policy paper was conceived as part of the on-going effort by the Baltic 
states to give substance to the idea of closer trilateral collaboration in the defence-
related research and technology (R&T) area. In May 2010, the ministers of defence of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania signed a Letter of Intent (LoI) concerning such 
collaboration, which is up for review in 2012. This LoI followed in the footsteps of a 
trilateral commitment of 2009 to establish a legal framework for R&T collaboration. It 
outlined several principles upon which trilateral (or bilateral) collaboration had to be 
based chiefly by setting a firm focus on capability development and by pursuing 
improvements in operational, logistical, organisational and other aspects of their 
defence organisations. The R&T coordinators of the defence ministries and the armed 
forces have been tasked to develop a set of more specific proposals regarding the areas 
in which synergies between the defence-related R&T agendas of the three countries 
could be achieved or where their interests in advancing this field in the future are 
shared. 
2.  Attempts to find grounds for Baltic collaboration in defence-related R&T are 
being made in the context of several broader trends, one of which is the effort to 
rejuvenate Baltic defence cooperation, which has been stagnating since accession to 
NATO, and to link it with Nordic defence cooperation (NORDEFCO) in the Nordic-Baltic 
framework. In the Baltic format, a few initiatives such as sharing training infrastructure, 
conducting joint procurements, carrying out joint maintenance and the generation of a 
common contribution to the NATO Response Force have recently been launched or are 
picking their way through various bureaucratic and political complexities. In the Nordic-
Baltic framework, discussions are focusing on the inclusion of the Baltic states in 
NORDEFCO, on bringing them all under the same EU Battle Group and on the 
enhancement of cooperation in cyber defence. Thus the intent to cooperate in defence-
related R&T adds to the overall impetus to enhance Baltic defence cooperation and 
potentially provides an additional linkage with the Nordic defence cooperation agenda. 
3.  The second major trend is that NATO and EU member states and partners are 
increasingly exploring the possibilities to team up in bilateral and multilateral R&T 
projects in order to reduce costs, to share risks, to achieve critical mass, to expand their 
scientific and technological knowledge base, to facilitate innovation and to promote 
interoperability of their forces. An illustration of this trend is the Anglo-French defence 
agreement of 2010, which included cooperation on the development of their defence 
technological bases and centres of excellence in key technology areas (FCO, 2010: 5). At 
the same time, there is a long-standing tradition of collaboration in defence R&T 
between various nations of NATO and the EU, often bringing together complementary 
competences. The drive to pursue more multilateral or bilateral R&T projects builds on 
this tradition and mutual trust generated by the well-established knowledge networks. 
NATO’s and the EU’s efforts to promote more common R&T and to eliminate the 
duplication of national defence acquisition programmes in the spirit of ‘smart defence’ 
and ‘pooling and sharing’ are also gaining traction, albeit with modest results so far (see 
Giegerich & Nicoll, 2012: 70). In any case, at the level of ideas, Baltic collaboration in 
defence-related R&T fits into this general trend very well. 
4.  The aim of this paper is to identify the areas of R&T in which collaboration 
between the Baltic states makes most sense, to determine the level of ambition they 
should aspire to and to propose a suitable ‘business model’ for such collaboration. It 
tries to take into account the experiences, current status, needs and future plans for 
R&T of each individual country, together with various contextual factors which may 
facilitate or, to the contrary, inhibit development of a collaborative R&T agenda. 
Defence policy and planning documents, national and defence sector R&T strategies and 
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interviews with defence planners, military leaders, military specialists and researchers in 
the three countries served as sources to develop insights and ideas on the subject.1 In-
depth research conducted by ICDS on the subject of defence R&D/R&T in some small 
NATO allies and in Estonia also informed and shaped assessments and proposals put 
forward in this paper. The paper does not seek to provide a detailed list of technologies 
which the Baltic states can develop together, but rather stays on the level of strategy by 
trying to define the ends, means and ways of Baltic collaboration in defence-related 
R&T. 
Approach 
5.  Before further elaboration of any ideas regarding Baltic collaboration in defence-
related R&T, it is necessary to explain the principles and assumptions which guided the 
efforts to harness those ideas from the Baltic defence and scientific establishments. 
First, in relation to the central concept of ‘research and technology’, it is assumed that: 
5.1 research, or search for new knowledge, in defence is not confined to the 
disciplines of natural sciences or engineering, but also includes social sciences 
and humanities; 
5.2 technology should be understood broadly, not only as military hardware 
(armaments and equipment). Systems, processes, methods, arrangements – 
including those not directly related to military hardware but pertaining to 
organisational and human aspects of armed forces – all can be considered as 
technology in a broad sense; 
5.3 as a field of activity, R&T does not necessarily lead to a new product on 
the defence market. Its aim is to generate new knowledge to be used in the 
development, improvement, sustaining and use of military force (e.g. in the 
management of human, financial and material resources, in the conduction of 
operations, in the acquisition of new capabilities, in the organisation of defence, 
etc.). In technical areas, this means R&T ends somewhere between the 
technology (or system) readiness levels (TRL/SRL) 4 and 5 (see Mankins, 1995) 
and thus encompasses basic and applied research and the initial stages of 
experimental development at most. 
6. Consequently, the above departure points widen the scope of national and 
trilateral defence-related R&T agendas beyond technical areas. Thus the circle of 
potential R&T stakeholders in the three defence organisations is extended beyond 
national armament directors and the structures supervised by them. In terms of its level 
of ambition (expected outcomes), the approach adopted in this paper towards R&T also 
mitigates the impact of such factors as the virtually non-existent defence industrial base 
and the modest testing and evaluation (T&E) infrastructure of the defence organisations 
in the Baltic states, all of which would be necessary if R&T were defined in a narrow 
techno-centric (or hardware-focused) way and were seen as extending all the way to 
TRL/SRL 9. 
7. The second set of considerations kept in mind throughout the research process 
for this paper concerns the nature and purposes of collaboration in defence-related 
R&T. Collaboration would normally mean the conduction of common R&T projects with 
researchers from the three countries submitting joint proposals (collaborative supply 
                                                 
1
 I am enormously grateful to all the people (at the Estonian Ministry of Defence, the Estonian Defence Forces, the 
Latvian Ministry of Defence, the Latvian National Armed Forces, the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence, the 
Lithuanian Armed Forces, the Baltic Defence College and civilian research establishments in Estonia) who kindly agreed to 
share their experiences, views and opinions, supplied me with valuable information and acted as a ‘sounding board’ for 
my ideas. 
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‘push’) to the three defence organisations or the joining of forces to fulfil a common 
requirement articulated by the three defence organisations (collaborative demand 
‘pull’). The purpose of such collaboration would be to share the costs and results, to 
exploit the complementarities of national scientific and technological competencies and 
to achieve a critical mass which each country lacks individually. However, collaboration 
in defence-related R&T between the Baltic states:  
7.1 could be sought to develop the knowledge and technology management 
competences and the science and technology awareness capacities of the 
defence organisations. This does not necessarily require the launch of formal 
research projects;  
7.2 could be bilateral rather than trilateral (as pointed out in the ministerial 
LoI);  
7.3 could be pursued to assure the quality or to enhance the 
multidisciplinary aspects of the ongoing national projects, based on the 
requirements of a single country (e.g. by one country which sub-contracts 
researchers from one or two other Baltic states to conduct independent peer 
reviews of the national project or to add missing segments of competence to it);  
7.4 could exist on the demand side (i.e. the formulation of common 
requirements and the provision of common funding) but not on the supply side 
(an R&T provider may be contracted from outside the region) and vice versa (i.e. 
R&T suppliers in the three countries may team up to provide services to defence 
contractors outside the Baltic states);  
7.5 could be launched in specific cases by merging similar ongoing projects, 
by initiating new projects in the areas where agendas for future R&T are aligned 
or both;  
7.6 could be conducted as part of the already existing (or planned) trilateral 
Baltic defence cooperation projects in order to bring new knowledge to these 
projects. 
8. The above considerations allow for a diversity of ‘business models’ in the 
framework of the Baltic collaborative R&T agenda, not just for a single-minded focus on 
trilateral demand leading to trilateral R&T projects (trilateral supply) or vice versa. 
(However, this paper does not involve cases of R&T suppliers from the three countries 
collaborating to undertake projects for customers other than the Baltic defence 
organisations.) This also means that the search for viable ideas could be conducted from 
different angles and perspectives and not only by exploring and comparing the needs 
that stem from separate military capability plans of the three nations or by comparing 
national defence-related R&T programmes. 
9. However, as a final note in explaining the approach adopted in this policy paper, 
it is essential to point out that defence-related R&T and respective collaboration efforts 
– no matter how defined and understood or from which perspective looked at – are only 
one input (among many) to various defence processes. The key question, which remains 
outside the purview of this paper, is whether the Baltic states truly have those processes 
in place and are able to benefit from the R&T inputs.  
Current status in defence-related R&T 
10. Defence-related R&T in the Baltic states has played a marginal role in the 
development of defence strategies, capabilities and organisations due to modest levels 
of investments and organisational capacities. The experiences and learning curves of the 
three states are broadly similar, with Estonia and to a certain degree Latvia being ahead 
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of Lithuania in the identification and specification of knowledge and technology areas of 
interest to defence. 
10.1 Although this was not set out in the existing defence research and 
development strategy of 2008, in practice Estonia seeks to focus its investments 
primarily in the areas of (1) situational awareness, systems, systems’ integration 
and decision-making; (2) force protection and sustainment; and (3) human 
factors and medicine, each of which is comprised of more specific technologies 
and competencies (see Jermalavičius, 2011: 25). The strategy will be reviewed 
and renewed in 2012. 
10.2 In Latvia, the sector is steered by the ministerial guidelines of 2006, 
which stated that the science, research and technology development policy  of 
the Latvian Ministry of Defence should encompass the areas of (1) national and 
international security; (2) military operations (including doctrines, command and 
control, intelligence, communications, logistics, defence against weapons of 
mass destruction and defence against terrorism); (3) resources for defence 
needs (including military industry, human resources, environmental protection, 
logistics and procurement, infrastructure); and (4) military science and 
technology (Grinpauks, 2010).2 (A new R&T programme for 2012–2015 is 
currently being drafted, using a recently approved capability development plan 
until 2032 as a basis.) 
10.3 Lithuania, on the other hand, does not have a clear and formalised 
strategy concerning its defence-related R&T investments. The development of 
such a strategy is now a task facing a newly established defence R&T 
coordination group in the Ministry of National Defence.  
11. Moreover, each country has undertaken projects similar to those in the 
portfolios of the other two (see Figure 1), although their mutual awareness about such 
projects has been relatively limited and mostly confined to information exchanges at the 
meetings of national R&T coordinators. All three countries struggle to increase the 
significance of defence-related R&T for the defence organisations, but the number of 
‘success stories’ – projects leading to significant and visible improvements in defence 
which can convincingly be communicated to all stakeholders – is very limited.  
12. On the other hand, it can be confidently asserted that as a result of past 
programmes and projects all three nations have established a certain base in defence-
related knowledge and technology which they are at risk of losing if minimum levels of 
investments are not maintained. In this regard, the size of their current defence-related 
R&T portfolios is not encouraging: Lithuania is funding only two projects from its R&T 
budget (in the areas of robotics, medical sensors and information management); Estonia 
– also two (in the areas of military psychology and bionics) with further seven (in the 
fields of military personnel health management, military medicine, the performance of 
armoured vehicles, materials, counter IED, radio-electronics for electronic warfare, 
textiles, modelling, simulation and military history) approved and to be launched in 
2012;3 Latvia has no projects, but it plans to re-start its programme in about 2014 and 
expects to benefit from some national (civilian) R&T programmes. 
 
                                                 
2 The scope of Estonia’s defence-related R&T policy does not extend to the area of international security research, 
although such research is actually conducted and funded by the Estonian MOD (e.g. projects carried out by ICDS). On the 
other hand, Latvia seems to consider ‘military science and technology’ as a distinct subset of its MOD’s science, research 
and technology development policy, but does not identify specific technologies of interest within it, which raises some 
legitimate questions about, for example, the difference between research in military operations (and specific sub-areas 
such as communications) and military science. These variations in the definitions of the R&T policy area in general and its 
specific sub-areas make direct comparisons between the two countries rather difficult. 
3 This does not include projects funded by the MOD and conducted by ICDS. 
  
BALTIC COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE-RELATED R&T | Tomas Jermalavičius 
 
 
8 
 
Figure 1: Selected national defence-related R&T projects in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania clustered 
into knowledge and technology areas. 
 
13. The funding allocated to R&T from the defence budgets – although Estonia’s 
share is larger than those of Latvia’s and Lithuania’s combined – relegates all three 
countries to the bottom league in the broader context of NATO and the EU. None of 
them come anywhere close to dedicating 2% of their defence budgets to this area, 
which is a benchmark agreed upon by the members of these organisations: according to 
the information obtained from the ministries of defence, Estonia plans to spend about 
0.18% of its defence budget on R&T in 2012 (or approximately 650,000 euros),4 
Lithuania – about 0.04% (approximately 102,000 euros) and Latvia has not earmarked 
any funding for the MOD-sponsored R&T projects at all.5 The funding shrank significantly 
and project portfolios were trimmed drastically in all three nations as a result of the 
financial crisis of 2008–2009. 
14. Despite that, all three nations eagerly participate in the activities of the NATO 
Research and Technology Organisation, RTO (soon to become NATO Science and 
Technology Organisation, STO), which serves as a good indicator of the areas where 
their interests overlap (see Table 1). Participation in the R&T programmes of the 
European Defence Agency (EDA), however, is less developed and less informative about 
coinciding interests: essentially, Lithuania is just an observer of the EDA’s R&T activities; 
Latvia and Estonia have assigned experts to some Category B activities (CapTechs), but 
Latvia so far does not participate in any projects, while Estonia is planning to launch its 
contribution to IN4STARS 2.06 project in 2012; Estonia has also expressed its readiness 
to participate in, and has even earmarked funds for contributing to, a planned Category 
A activity – Joint Investment Programme on Situational Awareness – which is, however, 
struggling to get the necessary endorsement from some key EU member states and has 
not been launched yet. In all three countries, the NATO RTO and its ‘business model’ 
obviously have much greater appeal than the EDA and its programmes. 
                                                 
4 This does not include research funded by the Estonian MOD from other budget lines than defence procurement (e.g. 
defence policy and infrastructure). Thus, if R&T is defined broadly as it is done in this paper, Estonia understates its full 
scale of investments in defence-related R&T. 
5 The Latvian MOD intends to resume funding R&T projects from its budget in 2013. However, some defence-related 
research is funded from the budget of the Latvian National Defence Academy and via national science programmes, so it 
does invest something in R&T. However, just as in the case of Estonia (see the above footnote), the fact that these 
expenditures are not recorded under defence-related R&T funding obscures the overall picture of how much the country 
actually invests in defence-related R&T (according to the broad definition). 
6 IN4STARS – Information Interoperability and Intelligence Interoperability by Statistics, Agents, Reasoning and Semantics. 
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Table 1: Participation of the Baltic states in the NATO RTO. 
 AVT HFM IST SAS SCI SET NMSG NURC 
EST  ● ● ● ● ○ ● ● 
LVA ● ● ○ ○  ○ ○  
LTU ○ ● ◌  • ●   
 
● – full-fledged participation (both in the governing body and research projects) 
• – participation in the research projects but no representative in the governing body 
○ – representative(s) in the governing body 
◌ – representative(s) in the governing body temporarily absent 
 
AVT – Applied Vehicle Technology; HFM – Human Factors & Medicine; IST – Information Systems 
Technology; SAS – System Analysis & Studies; SCI – Systems Concepts & Integration; SET – Sensors 
& Electronics Technology; NMSG – NATO Modelling & Simulation Group; NURC – NATO Undersea 
Research Centre. 
 
15. All three nations mostly rely on the science and technology capabilities of the 
civilian sector for the development of defence-related applications. So far, at the policy 
level, only Latvia has established a clear link between its defence interests and a broader 
strategic agenda of national R&T as well as, in more practical terms, has mapped the 
national supply base for dual-use (civilian and military) solutions. Four areas in its 
national S&T investments programme for 2010–2013 were identified as being of interest 
to defence (an interview with an official at the Latvian MOD): 
15.1 Energy research as it allows Latvia to increase energy efficiency and the 
autonomy of its military systems;  
15.2 New materials and nanotechnology research as it provides new 
solutions to force protection, IED detection and countering; 
15.3 Health research as it generates knowledge for addressing the issues of 
stress impact on military personnel, for monitoring their wellbeing and for the 
assessment of the impact of military installations on public health; 
15.4  Society and demography research as it extends the necessary 
understanding of the trends relevant to defence recruitment and retention 
policies and strategies. 
16. In Estonia, some tentative efforts have recently been made to synchronise 
defence-related R&T with the national research, development and innovation strategy 
and to propose areas of investment in dual-use (military and civilian) R&T, but without 
any visible outcomes so far. In Lithuania, no discussion has been undertaken in the 
defence organisation at all on whether and how to link R&T with its national strategy for 
science and technology. Defence officials in both countries admit that they are only 
dimly aware of what is being done in the civilian sector and of what could be captured 
for defence purposes.  
17. Conversely, the civilian research sector in all three countries also has a very 
limited understanding of the defence organisations and of how to work with them, often 
treating defence as if it lacked real opportunities and resources in order to engage with 
it. The civilian S&T sector in the Baltic states does not have much to offer in terms of 
specialised defence-related R&T centres that are dedicated to serve the knowledge 
needs of the defence organisations and possess an effective understanding of the 
military. The Institute of Defence Technologies at Kaunas University of Technology, 
focused primarily on the modelling and integration of certain systems, and the 
International Centre for Defence Studies in Tallinn, concentrating mostly on regional 
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security, defence policy, military strategy and defence management issues, come close 
to being such centres, but they lack researchers with military experience and 
background.  
18. None of the Baltic defence organisations have an in-house R&T centre of 
competence, which would serve as a knowledge brokering hub between them and the 
wider science and technology community (national and international). According to the 
interviews conducted for this paper, the current thinking in Lithuania and in Latvia is 
that the research centres of their national military academies – the Institute of Military 
Science at the Lithuanian Military Academy (and its centres for military technology, 
strategic research and military history) and the Defence Science and Research Centre at 
the Latvian National Defence Academy – will become such knowledge brokering hubs in 
the future. The latter centre, however, is still very rudimentary in its capacity. Both 
countries fall short of a coherent vision and strategy regarding such centres, while 
Estonia has made a decision to reorganise the Applied Research Centre of the Estonian 
National Defence College into a training and doctrine command altogether.  
19. Judging from the interviews, the defence organisations of the Baltic states lack 
in many fields the critical mass of skilled and experienced subject matter experts 
(specialists), especially those with advanced degrees. There are some knowledge and 
technology areas in which each organisation has no more than a few experts, who are 
often totally preoccupied with their routine functions and duties. Thus the ability of the 
organisations to conduct and sustain in-house research and to interact competently with 
the broader science and technology community is very constrained. In academic terms, 
their resultant ‘absorptive capacity’ or ‘institutions, incentives and processes for 
effective technology learning’ (Wylie et al., 2006: 271) are very modest.  
20. This is compounded by similarly modest project management and administrative 
capacities allocated to R&T and the lack of concept development, experimentation and 
doctrine development practices, which often serve as a stimulant of demand for R&T 
inputs. Some tentative steps are being made to bolster the technological competences 
of the armed forces (e.g. the intention of the Lithuanian Military Academy to run a 
degree programme in technology management), but it will take time before they can get 
started and make any visible impact. 
21. Baltic trilateral cooperation in defence-related R&T has so far been most 
pronounced in one trilateral ‘community of practice’, which brings together military 
specialists from one particular field. Namely, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian military 
psychologists collaborate through their BaltMilPsy Forum to conduct research, to share 
their research results and to adapt the BATTLEMIND training programme of the U.S. 
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research to the needs of the armed forces of the Baltic 
states. In the past, there have been collaboration projects where one country included 
R&T providers from another (e.g. Latvia’s project on bioremediation strategies for 
contaminated sites, partly funded by the MOD, also involved some Estonian researchers 
from the University of Tartu) and projects pending approval within a multi-national 
framework such as the NATO RTO have had participants from two countries (e.g. a 
project on microelectromechanical systems technology for vehicle tracking applications 
was submitted for funding from the RTO support programme by a team from Kaunas 
University of Technology in Lithuania and Riga Technical University in Latvia). 
22. However, research collaboration within pan-Baltic military ‘communities of 
practice’ or through project teams of civilian universities have remained the exception 
rather than the rule. So far, regular trilateral meetings between various military 
‘communities of practice’ (e.g. military cartographers, military engineers, medical, C3I, 
strategic communication, environmental management, modelling and simulation 
experts, etc.) have not led to any sustained collaboration in R&T neither as a source of 
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commonly articulated demand for research inputs from external providers nor as a 
framework for collaborative R&T projects by military experts themselves (as in the case 
of military psychologists). 
23. The Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL) occasionally serves as a hub for 
knowledge-sharing among individual specialists and researchers in such areas as 
leadership, ethics, military history and various aspects of military operations, but it has 
not been used as an incubator for sustained trilateral defence-related R&T 
collaboration, the more so as it has very limited resources to serve as such. It does 
provide some opportunities in the form of seminars, workshops, conferences and 
publications to enhance mutual awareness about research activities in each country and 
beyond, but those opportunities are not systematically utilised by the three countries in 
their national defence-related R&T programmes. A trilateral R&T awareness-building, 
knowledge-sharing and networking initiative – the annual Baltic Defence Research and 
Technology Conference, launched in 2008 – has also been abandoned due to financial 
pressures and the lack of an effective vision behind it. 
Main obstacles to collaboration 
24. There are several sets of issues which shape the possibilities of Baltic 
collaboration in defence-related R&T. On the one hand, the resolution of some issues is 
potentially a good starting point for collaboration. On the other hand, other issues are 
going to remain and will have an impact on the collaboration models and agendas, so 
they will have to be managed carefully. It is essential that the stakeholders map and 
appreciate these issues if collaboration is going to be more than just a one-off 
undertaking and is not intended for show-off purposes. In the course of research for this 
paper, the following sets of issues have been identified. 
24.1 Conceptual. Large sections of all three defence organisations define R&T 
very narrowly as only related to armaments, equipment and systems. A 
corresponding expectation is that projects should deliver visible, tangible 
products rather than just new knowledge. Even when the merits of new 
knowledge generated by applied research are acknowledged, it is argued that it 
is often very difficult to justify financial expenditures to auditors or the general 
public if there are no visible deliverables (i.e. a piece of equipment) or if a 
negative result is achieved (which, in science, is also a result – a point well made 
by one Latvian defence official). Since the defence industrial base for the use of 
R&T outcomes to produce such deliverables (or bring technology to the highest 
TRL and to the market) is extremely thin in all three countries, investments in 
R&T are often perceived as ineffectual and unjustifiable. 
24.2 Cultural. As a logical extension of the above conceptual view on R&T, 
many members of the defence organisations dismiss the relevance of R&T to 
defence organisations and adopt a ‘buy-off-the-shelf’ attitude. The culture of 
ignorance towards R&T means that there is even little understanding of how it 
can support an ‘intelligent buyer’ posture when buying something ‘off-the-shelf’ 
or help develop different aspects of the defence organisations and their 
capabilities. Not one of the three defence organisations exhibits a strong 
tradition of using scientific advice in its work as they rely mostly on experiential 
learning. At lower organisational levels, there is a lot of knowledge about 
specific military problem solving to which R&T could make a valuable 
contribution, but this knowledge often does not make it to higher decision-
making levels and thus does not lead to user-driven R&T projects. The absence 
of coherent and effective knowledge, technology and innovation strategies, 
their management competences and the requisite organisational cultures in the 
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three defence organisations forces R&T to languish ‘out in the cold’ and 
whatever number of collaborative trilateral projects will not help overcome this 
problem. 
24.3 Planning. On the surface, all three countries run well-established and 
formal defence planning and capability development processes in the long, 
medium and short term. However, many plans never get implemented due to 
constant shifts in political and military priorities, urgent operational 
requirements, financial constraints, the lack of ‘business continuity’ and 
underestimated challenges. The requirements based on the capability needs are 
unstable, whereas stability is essential for R&T to make a meaningful input. 
Furthermore, many advanced military capabilities, which each of the Baltic 
states aspires to possess, are often understood by their defence organisations in 
a shallow and superficial way, while efforts to develop a deeper understanding 
are hampered by the lack of subject matter experts. In this context, all three 
nations struggle to derive effective requirements for R&T from their capability 
plans. This greatly complicates the implementation of the vision to base such 
collaboration mainly on capability needs in accordance with the ministerial LoI 
on defence-related R&T collaboration. 
24.4 Organisational. As pointed out above in the description of the current 
situation in the defence-related R&T sector, the three defence organisations lack 
centres of competence and knowledge brokering hubs in their structures, even 
in ‘core competence’ areas such as land warfare. Moreover, their doctrine 
development is not linked with research (although, at least theoretically, Latvia 
has an organisational arrangement for very effective coordination between the 
execution of research, concept development, doctrine, training and education: 
the commanding officer of its Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC, is also 
in charge of the entire military education system and the rudimentary in-house 
research centre).  
i. Notably, there are differences in where each country allocates 
its policy coordination responsibility for R&T: the Latvian MOD places it 
with its personnel department because this sector is perceived as being 
closely aligned with knowledge, competences and human resources; 
more in tune with their procurement-centric and armament/equipment-
focused perspectives, the Estonian ministry has assigned the 
responsibility to its procurement department and the Lithuanian 
ministry to its armaments and systems department.7 
24.5 Legal. In Latvia and, although less strictly, also in Lithuania, the 
contracting of R&T services is subject to public procurement laws, which forbid 
the expression of preference for a fixed configuration of suppliers. This makes it 
difficult, if not outright impossible, to always show preference for pan-Baltic 
R&T consortia (e.g. by following the principle ‘common proposals get common 
funding’). Any bidder from just one of the three countries, or entirely from 
outside of the region, would be able to challenge trilateral decisions to disqualify 
it for not being ‘Baltic’ enough (i.e. having suppliers from all three Baltic states) 
in a court of law. However, this does not prevent the defence organisations in 
the Baltic states from teaming up to undertake common procurement of R&T 
                                                 
7
 This also complicates common decision-making at a higher level: Lithuania’s and Estonia’s National Armament Directors 
(NADs) can discuss R&T issues and agree on common courses of action, but their Latvian colleague cannot contribute 
because R&T matters are not under his/her authority. At the same time, defence-related R&T investments that do not 
pertain to armaments and equipment but rather to human resources, doctrines and organisations do not fall within the 
remit of NADs at all, even though their subordinates in Lithuania and Estonia – national R&T coordinators – have to deal 
with such investments simply because there is no one else to do so. 
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services and from drawing up joint contracts with their chosen suppliers if their 
requirements coincide. On the other hand, the dearth of joint armament and 
equipment procurement efforts by the Baltic states could indicate that joint 
procurement of R&T services might be an equally fraught matter. 
24.6 Political. The ambition to launch trilateral collaboration in defence-
related R&T should be treated in the context of complicated defence relations 
between the three Baltic states. On the one hand, the ministers have a strong 
political will to push ahead to deepen and broaden the trilateral cooperation 
agenda. Military-to-military cooperation (e.g. in training and exercises) is often 
close and intensive. However, the Baltic defence establishments also exhibit 
competitive instincts vis-à-vis each other, a lack of mutual trust and respect, 
together with divergent preferences for collaboration partners (e.g. Estonia 
often pursues closer ties with Finland and Sweden than with Latvia and 
Lithuania; Lithuania seeks to build closer defence relations with Poland). The 
Baltic states increasingly tend to give bilateral configurations (e.g. Lithuania-
Latvia, Estonia-Latvia) precedence over trilateral solutions and to seek expanded 
regional collaboration in the Nordic-Baltic format. Little progress is made on 
new, and not so new, trilateral cooperation initiatives, such as joint 
procurement, which could serve as sources of common demand for R&T inputs. 
There is little enthusiasm for establishing new common organisations with 
physical bases (as opposed to ‘virtual’ and ad hoc arrangements) in addition to 
the already existing ones or for embedding people within each other’s structures 
to facilitate networking, to build trust and to increase integration between the 
three defence organisations. 
24.7 Human resources. A set of problems is associated with the quality of 
human resources involved in national defence-related R&T programmes. This is 
the ‘elephant in the room’ as it is obvious to everyone and referred to in many 
conversations, but never recognised and addressed properly. A certain number 
of players congregate in this field in each country – researchers, engineers, 
administrators and policymakers – whose deficiencies in ‘transferrable’ skills 
(e.g. networking, management or foreign languages), professional competence, 
reputation, past record and even character and attitudes draw derision from 
various stakeholders in their own defence systems and beyond. They often 
manage to alienate key decision-makers and foreign partners, thus undermining 
the credibility of their initiatives and efforts, no matter how beneficial those 
efforts may prove to be in the long-term perspective if viewed objectively. Those 
few active, competent and enthusiastic players who are the driving force behind 
the existing programmes can go only as far with the advancement of national 
and trilateral R&T agendas as the quality of human resources concentrated in 
this field (and the respect it commands in various quarters) permits. 
24.8 Financial. All three defence organisations came under severe financial 
pressure during the financial crisis of 2008–2010 and had to make cuts in their 
defence budgets. Estonia’s defence spending has already rebounded and is 
expected to constitute 2% of GDP in 2012, while Latvia’s and especially 
Lithuania’s remain low, roughly at about half of this level or even less. This 
means that more urgent or, in the eyes of the defence decision-makers in Latvia 
and Lithuania, more essential priorities must receive greater attention and 
financing, making any substantial increases in the funding allocated to R&T very 
unlikely in the medium or even long term. Although international collaboration 
in R&T (and in other areas) yields better results and offers savings in the long-
term perspective, it often requires additional financial inputs compared to 
purely national programmes. In addition, the costs of R&T projects – national or 
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international – are usually evident early on (and, if it is decided to move projects 
beyond R&T to higher TRLs, they multiply exponentially in technical areas), while 
the benefits of such investments often remain uncertain and become visible 
only after years of sustained spending. Given the current and the foreseeable 
financial climate, it is unlikely that the defence decision-makers of the Baltic 
states will approve any ambitious R&T projects, whether national or 
collaborative.  
Main opportunities 
25. There is a range of opportunities for collaboration in defence-related R&T 
between the Baltic states. If exploited and built upon skilfully, they could provide a 
sustainable basis for expanding this collaboration in the future and even enable 
cooperation in certain areas where it is currently struggling to advance beyond political 
declarations (e.g. joint procurement, common capabilities and joint maintenance). The 
following opportunities were identified in the course of the interviews.  
25.1 Defence policymakers are becoming increasingly interested in science 
and technology and S&T foresight in order to understand major S&T trends and 
their implications to defence policy, military strategy and current and future 
capabilities. They are also ardent users of research into various aspects of global, 
regional and national security issues. 
25.2 All three countries have broadly similar experiences from international 
operations and realise the need to better understand political, military 
(strategic, operational and tactical), socio-cultural and physical environments in 
which their armed forces may have to operate in the future and the potential 
implications of those environments for the development of their capabilities. 
25.3 Due to the direction in which the Alliance’s capabilities are evolving, 
there is also an overlapping interest to gain a better understanding of the 
technical, doctrinal, operational, organisational and other aspects of some 
currently existing, or emerging, highly advanced capabilities and technologies, 
together with their implications for the development of national defence. In 
particular, the study of the concept of Networked Enabled Capabilities (NEC) and 
its associated domains (e.g. command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – C4ISR; unmanned platforms; 
human-machine interfaces; systems integration; cyber defence, etc.) were 
mentioned during the interviews in all three countries. 
25.4 Due to Latvia’s and Lithuania’s transition to the all-volunteer force 
format, they are increasingly interested in the improvement of human resources 
management to stay competitive in the labour market, in the implications of 
broader societal changes (e.g. migration trends) for the armed forces and in 
military sociology. Estonia is also considering whether to expand research into 
various aspects of human resources management. The financial crisis seems to 
have imbued all three defence organisations with a new sense of urgency to 
better manage their small (and, in some cases, still shrinking) workforce. 
25.5 Some senior and mid-level defence officials in the Baltic states are 
becoming more aware of the dismal state of the knowledge and technology 
management competence both at the level of individuals (both generalists and 
specialists) and throughout the defence organisations. 
25.6 Various specialist ‘communities of practice’, sparse as they are within 
the three defence organisations, are very eager to learn and advance their 
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specialist competences not only on the basis of experiential learning but also by 
using inputs from research and technology projects. Interaction with R&T, just as 
with the Baltic and other NATO/EU counterparts, is accepted as an important 
contributor to the professional growth of such ‘communities of practice’. 
25.7 Two countries – Latvia and Lithuania – have aspirations to add research 
arms to their national military academies and to acquire at least some research 
capacity in the fields of military technology, concepts and doctrines. 
25.8 Latvia and Lithuania have areas of overlapping interest in the 
development of products based on R&T results and national S&T competences 
because some of the products available on the market are too expensive, 
complex or not easily adaptable to specific requirements (e.g. there is some 
interest in the development of cheap, simple, easy-to-assemble and dispensable 
small robots for military engineers – Lithuania even runs a formal project in this 
area – and small dispensable UAVs to train air defence troops). 
25.9 A major challenge lies in the management of the so-called ‘legacy’ 
armaments, equipment and systems in the inventory of the armed forces, 
acquired in the past as donations from supporting nations or as purchases of 
‘second-hand’ military hardware. In some cases, applied research is needed (e.g. 
in materials, mechanics, electronics) to understand the possibilities for 
extending the life-time of such hardware and/or for enhancing related 
capabilities. (For example, Lithuania has considered conducting research into the 
materials required to produce pods for Soviet machine guns still in its arsenal.) 
25.10 All three countries periodically renew the field uniforms of their military 
personnel, often starting with a rather comprehensive process of analysis 
necessary to draft operational and technical requirements. Research into textiles 
is something all three would be able to utilise to support this process. 
25.11 Some R&T projects get stalled because one Baltic state lacks proper 
testing and evaluation (T&E) infrastructure or civilian or military capabilities 
domestically, while such capabilities may actually exist in one of the other two 
Baltic states. Greater awareness of the T&E services provided by civilian and 
military organisations in each of the Baltic states would open up possibilities to 
pool and share those T&E resources for the benefit of national, bilateral and 
trilateral R&T projects. 
25.12 Some of the current trilateral cooperation organisations and projects 
have a potential, which is in reality exploited too, to generate by definition a 
common demand for R&T inputs (e.g. the development of a maritime mine 
countermeasures – MMCM – capability was pointed out as a possible direction 
for further research into how to support BALTRON’s functioning in the future; 
the Baltic Defence College constantly requires research inputs in the areas 
covered by its programmes such as international relations and international 
security; laws of armed conflict; society and the military; military history, theory, 
strategy and operations; leadership; management; military technology, etc.). 
Starting with capacity building 
26. Given the above assessment, it appears that the attempt of the ministerial LoI to 
steer defence-related R&T collaboration directly towards capability development is too 
ambitious under present conditions. The number of national and trilateral supporting 
mechanisms, structures, capacities and resources is not adequate to enable such a 
focus. Each country struggles with its own national defence-related R&T programme – 
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its legitimacy, strategy, financing, processes and impact on capability development. In a 
trilateral framework with its own complications, there is a significant risk that those 
problems may be pooled, shared and amplified rather than deliver smart solutions to 
capability needs and gaps. This would inevitably damage the credibility of trilateral Baltic 
cooperation initiatives and the already struggling area of defence-related R&T. 
27. The capability-focused approach is certainly appropriate as a long-term vision of 
what collaborative efforts should seek. However, movement towards that vision 
requires certain capacities which are currently not in place in the defence organisations 
of the Baltic states. To start with, there is a need to strengthen the prospects, impetus 
and impact of defence-related R&T in each of the Baltic states. A large part of this effort 
could be undertaken trilaterally. (Indeed, it is highly advisable to do so because more 
diverse inputs into the exploration of ideas and the analysis of needs tend to lead to 
better outcomes.) The Baltic states could collaborate and achieve critical mass and 
synergy in the following areas. 
27.1 Awareness building in their defence organisations about S&T, its impact 
on security and defence; about emerging strategic and/or disruptive 
technologies; and about future capabilities. None of them has individually been 
able to achieve this prerequisite for a long-term perspective, intelligent defence 
investments and risk management. A collaborative research effort into S&T 
monitoring, analysis, foresight and future capabilities could address this gap and 
serve as a catalyst for further collaborative work in more specific knowledge and 
technology areas where the defence planners of the Baltic states would come to 
recognise particular challenges as a result of such research. 
27.2 The provision of a common platform for their defence organisations and 
national S&T communities to interact, to exchange information about national 
policies and programmes, to understand the perspectives of various 
stakeholders, to cross-fertilise their ideas and to learn about on-going work and 
potential opportunities for defence-related R&T. The organisation of a rigorously 
structured biennial regional conference, accompanied by more specialised 
seminars of particular ‘communities of practice’ and supported by a common 
database of national projects and S&T competences, would be a key measure in 
this regard. This would create a forum for the generation of ‘bottom up’ ideas 
relevant to defence needs and would also facilitate the commissioning of peer 
reviews for R&T projects individually conducted in each country without 
sufficient international exposure and independent domestic expertise. 
27.3 The building of their capacities for in-house applied research, concept 
development and experimentation in the areas of military ‘core competences’ 
(e.g. military theory, operations, tactics, doctrine, education and training; 
military technology; logistics; military personnel management, leadership and 
command, etc.). It would be necessary to harmonise the build-up, mission and 
work programmes of the research centres of the national defence academies (or 
their research capacities if no such centres exist). Ideally, representatives of the 
existing (and often cooperating) military ‘communities of practice’ would be 
included in these research centres. Collaboration between in-house centres 
would also make it possible to avoid legal issues stemming from public 
procurement laws because public tenders are not required for it. 
28. The above three closely interwoven strands, which could be labelled as ‘capacity 
building’ (see Figure 2), need to be developed as a coherent whole and to be linked up 
with the best practices of more experienced allies and partners. This requires a fourth 
strand of effort – coordinated guidance and oversight from the three national R&T 
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authorities in the defence ministries and close coordination between the executive 
organisations (e.g. national defence academies) with sufficient administrative resources.  
29. It would be particularly helpful if a key organisation had a strong sense of stake 
in this three-pronged effort with (a) a firm commitment to Baltic defence cooperation 
and to intellectual and professional growth of all three defence organisations; and (b) 
strong international links. (As it happens, such an organisation already exists: a pan-
Baltic identity, the pursuit of multinational solutions and ‘best practices’, and the 
utilisation of knowledge relevant to military organisations are the cornerstones of the 
Baltic Defence College, BALTDEFCOL.8)   
 
Figure 2: Collaborative capacity building for pan-Baltic defence-related R&T.
9
 
30. All these factors (research into S&T monitoring, analysis, foresight and future 
capabilities, a regional defence-related R&T forum, the development of internal 
capacities to conduct R&T and their co-ordination mechanisms) are crucial, but they are 
still only ‘enablers’ that set the stage for further collaboration in a longer term 
perspective. Some key questions remain: (a) which areas represent common interests 
and (b) what should be the level of ambition in terms of deliverables in those areas? 
31. Of course, these shared interests would eventually mostly be generated by joint 
research into foresight and future capabilities and by collaboration in the areas of 
military ‘core competences’: they would point to the directions where the Baltic states 
                                                 
8 BALTDEFCOL also has experience in leading the harmonisation process of national policies in a field critical to its mission 
success – the continuous professional development of military officers. Such experience would be valuable and relevant 
in the harmonisation of the strategies and agendas of the research arms of the national defence academies. 
9 Awareness capacity is defined as a ‘means of effective technology searching to identify opportunities for R&D 
investments’, absorptive capacity as ‘institutions, incentives and processes for effective technology learning’ and 
transactional capacity as a ‘trusted transactional environment to facilitate knowledge formation and exchanges’ (Wylie et 
al., 2006: 271). 
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need to invest in and accumulate knowledge in the long term, so that the acquisition of 
new capabilities would be based on competent scientific and technological advice.  
32. However, since they would not be starting as a clean slate in defence-related 
R&T and since research into military affairs necessarily branches out into broader 
domains of S&T, it is possible to put forward several areas of overlapping interest, which 
could serve as the initial thematic repertoire of collaboration. They are elaborated in the 
order of coinciding interests and feasibility in Table 2 below, drawing upon a general 
assessment of the area’s potential, the interviews conducted for this paper and an 
analysis of the present and past activities in R&T by the three defence organisations. 
Table 2: Knowledge and technology domains with the most potential for Baltic collaboration. 
Domain Rationale 
Human factors, 
medicine, sociological 
research 
Psychological and physical wellbeing of defence personnel; their behaviour and 
performance in various situations; values and norms; decision-making, communication 
and learning patterns; interfaces with technology and society  – these and similar 
topics are constant issues in defence organisations, no matter in which direction their 
military capabilities evolve or what national defence planning documents stipulate. 
Concentrating on them makes it possible to generate new knowledge and to develop 
solutions which can always be tied in with many other areas of R&T (e.g. materials for 
uniforms, soldier monitoring and protection systems, individual training simulators, 
personnel management, etc.). All three Baltic states have some ‘cutting edge’ 
knowledge in this area in their S&T communities and contribute to the activities of the 
NATO RTO HFM panel. Military psychologists – one particular ‘community of practice’ 
– also cooperate between themselves, conducting collaborative research in the three 
defence organisations. All three countries have also been conducting individual 
research on various aspects of human factors, military sociology and medicine. The 
results can often be utilised without significant capital investments but by simply 
adjusting the policies and procedures in human resources management, which makes 
it an attractive and potentially ‘low cost-high impact’ direction for national R&T and 
trilateral collaboration. 
 
International security 
 
Defence organisations always operate in a broader security landscape which shapes 
their missions, strategies and capability needs. Many non-military (economic, societal, 
environmental, energy and cyber) dimensions of security have military implications 
which have to be studied and understood as part of strategic planning in defence. 
Ministries of defence of the Baltic states have a track record of commissioning and 
using research into various aspects of international security. Civilian research 
establishments in the Baltic states – universities and think-tanks – have acquired 
substantial expertise in various fields of international security research and have also 
often successfully cooperated between themselves. In many regards, it would be very 
beneficial if more effort – both on the demand side and on the supply side – was put 
into pooling research competence in such areas of common interest as regional 
security in the Baltic Sea region; Russia’s foreign, security and defence policies; the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership; and transatlantic security. It would help raise the profile of 
the Baltic states internationally; support their defence diplomacy efforts; create 
opportunities to cooperate with the Nordic countries; avoid the duplication of 
programmes; and build critical mass in what is still a very fragmented area of 
knowledge production in our region. 
 
Management and 
administration 
Similarly to the previous domain, defence also relies on some form of organisation, 
which is continuously evolving. Many military successes depend on a superior 
organisation of military efforts (both in peacetime and during conflict), so the issues of 
organisational culture, organisational behaviour, organisational learning, performance 
management, command and control arrangements remain pertinent at all times. This 
rationale is further strengthened by the fact that defence organisations have to 
continuously change and adapt to new strategic, operational and tactical 
environments, technologies and societal and economic realities. Research and 
development of new organisational concepts will be key to the implementation of 
NATO’s ideas concerning ‘smart defence’. Each Baltic state has been building its 
individual awareness of ‘best practices’ in this field and reflecting on its own defence 
reforms and on broader security sector reforms, but this has not involved much 
original research so far. However, this area will require greater attention from the 
Baltic defence policymakers as the pressure to improve organisational performance, to 
reduce inefficiencies and to derive better value from defence investments will not go 
away. 
  
BALTIC COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE-RELATED R&T | Tomas Jermalavičius 
 
 
19 
Domain Rationale 
Modelling and 
simulation (M&S) and 
training simulation 
technology 
 
Modelling and simulation has long established itself as a pivotal area in the 
development and sustaining of military force. Enhanced use of M&S and training 
simulation technologies makes it possible both to reduce costs and to increase 
opportunities for military innovation. Estonia and Lithuania have their own capabilities 
in this area, with centres at the ENDC and the TRADOC respectively. Although the 
levels of development of the two centres are different, both countries take a keen 
interest in M&S technologies and know-how which can be accessed through the NMSG 
and bilateral ties with NATO allies. Latvia’s defence authorities also show an interest in 
expanding the application of M&S. All three countries have been conducting R&T 
projects in M&S (e.g. to enable modelling and simulation of cyber attacks) and 
developing training simulators for various purposes (e.g. a rifle shooting simulator, a 
maritime mine countermeasures simulator). Trilateral collaboration between the three 
defence organisations to advance their expertise in this field of technology, especially 
taking into account the extent of their common military training activities, would bring 
immense practical benefits. 
 
C4ISR The ability to collect, transmit, fuse, analyse, share, store, use and protect information 
is central to defence organisations and ever more so to the concept of Network 
Enabled Capabilities with many of these processes getting better integrated and more 
automated. Defence organisations are operating in a data-rich environment and 
military advantage will increasingly be conferred upon those who are more adroit at 
exploiting it. Furthermore, various C4ISR systems have to be made interoperable with 
the ‘legacy systems’ in defence organisations and with the systems of the allies, which 
always renders R&T efforts in this area pertinent and useful. The field also combines a 
variety of technologies (sensors, data links, software, etc.) which require very diverse 
inputs and a broad knowledge base. The Baltic states have been contributing to the 
NATO RTO SCI and SET panels and possess some ‘cutting edge’ R&T competences in 
computing, electronics and information technology. Their defence organisations 
persistently list investments in ISR, C3I and related fields as their priority and they 
would benefit greatly from pooling their R&T expertise to support this priority with 
new knowledge.  
 
Information assurance: 
cyber security and cyber 
defence 
Cyber defence is currently one of the most popular subjects in security and military 
affairs. It is also one of the most dynamically developing areas, with NATO, the EU and 
their individual members increasing their resources to counter the growing range and 
intensity of threats in cyber space. As defence organisations are highly dependent on 
situational awareness and command and control systems, the protection of their 
systems is critical to mission success. Estonia hosts the NATO Cooperative Cyber 
Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which also has Latvia and Lithuania as its 
sponsoring nations (even though their national attention to cyber issues at the 
policymaking and policy execution levels is not matching that of Estonia’s). It would be 
very useful to pool S&T expertise on projects in cyber security and defence in order to 
support national strategies and to enable cooperation with Nordic countries, although 
so far only Estonia has carried out defence-funded R&T projects in this field. In political 
terms, trilateral collaboration in this domain might not make much sense and add 
much value, given that the three countries can simply concentrate more efforts on 
CCDCOE, instead of developing a parallel trilateral programme.  
 
Unmanned platforms 
and systems 
The trend towards automating warfare in all its dimensions is accelerating and 
autonomous vehicle technology is critical to that. The numbers of unmanned 
platforms and systems, especially UAVs, deployed in operations are growing. Key 
military powers plus NATO are investing more resources to advance this technology 
and to increase their reliance on it. (Civilian security organisations are also exploring 
how to make more extensive use of such technology, thus opening opportunities for 
interagency collaboration and synergy.) Even though human supervisors will remain ‘in 
the loop’ in the near future, in the long-term advanced autonomous systems will be 
granted ever greater degrees of decision-making authority, which will raise multiple 
challenges not only of technical, but also of moral, legal, political and doctrinal nature. 
This requires multi-disciplinary research inputs in this field to develop a thorough 
understanding of the emerging capability and the possible risks and opportunities 
related to its deployment. All three Baltic states have invested in R&T in this area and 
have participated in the NATO RTO AVT panel, which means there is a certain 
knowledge base in place. Each Baltic state also pursues the acquisition of unmanned 
platforms and systems (e.g. tactical reconnaissance UAVs, underwater demining 
robots, contribution to NATO’s common UAV acquisition project), which makes it 
necessary to properly understand the technology, its management challenges and its 
future evolution. 
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Domain Rationale 
Electromagnetic 
spectrum technologies 
Various applications derived from scientific research on different parts of the 
electromagnetic spectrum constitute the bedrock of many essential military 
capabilities from radar surveillance and communications to counter-IED and electronic 
warfare capabilities. Military planners and defence acquisition managers will always be 
interested in understanding scientific and technological developments in this field, 
their implications for military capabilities and methods for protecting personnel, 
equipment and systems from disruption or neutralisation using EMS-based 
technologies. This field may also attract those in charge of critical civilian 
infrastructure protection. Estonia’s and Lithuania’s defence organisations have a track 
record of R&T investments in this domain and Estonia has even achieved some success 
in equipment development both for military and civilian security organisations. At 
lower levels of ambition, both countries may find it useful to combine their knowledge 
and experience to support knowledge needs of their defence and national security 
organisations. 
 
 
33. The above list is not finite; it could be extended. (The areas mentioned come in 
addition to research required to develop the ‘core competences’ of the military plus S&T 
foresight and the awareness of future capabilities.) However, it would be wise to start 
with one or two areas and gradually expand the scope of activities, with the most 
important criterion being whether experts in those fields – primarily members of the 
defence organisations but also MoD-funded researchers from civilian research 
establishments – see any benefits in collaboration and have a national knowledge base 
to draw on. Combined with the four-pronged approach suggested earlier, a focus on 
these areas would allow bottom-up initiatives to spring up and get underway in a guided 
fashion. If the three defence organisations simply expected the top-down requirements 
(demand ‘pull’) to materialise from the defence planners, followed by bilateral or 
trilateral harmonisation and resourcing, it would mean a long wait for them before 
growing up in intellectual and managerial aspects. In addition, as one interviewed 
defence official underlined, it was pointless to enforce artificially construed bilateral or 
trilateral projects top-down if there was no enthusiasm or capacity to implement them 
by the S&T communities in the Baltic states. 
34. There is another important consideration which has to be kept in mind: as it was 
stated in the beginning, R&T collaboration should not be pushed too far in terms of its 
level of ambition (expressed in TRLs/SRLs – R&T ends between levels 4 and 5). Many 
stakeholders in the three organisations have an inherent temptation to seek projects 
which produce ‘hardware’ and/or lead to new products for the defence market (and 
represent something to be shown to the public for the money spent). Such ambitions 
are expensive, risky and unrealistic, given the resources, prevailing attitudes, S&T and 
defence market awareness, the competences and capacities of the three defence 
organisations and the size of the national S&T and defence industrial bases. By 
concentrating collaborative defence R&T investments mainly on applied research, the 
Baltic states would avoid many wasteful failures which usually mark these ambitions 
(even in much better resourced and more experienced nations) and which would also 
discredit the idea of trilateral cooperation. The level of ambition, just as it was 
recommended in the ICDS report on Estonia’s defence R&D (see Jermalavičius, 2011), 
should be fixed at the production of new knowledge through applied research (and, in 
some cases, experimental development) and at ensuring its proper utilisation for the 
development of various aspects of the Baltic defence organisations (e.g. intelligent 
procurement processes, better management of human resources, improvements in 
training and education, the enhancement of interoperability with the allies, increased 
visibility in quid pro quo knowledge exchanges with the allies, etc.). 
35. Large programmes leading from basic research to new products have to be 
supported by a proper organisational framework, usually in the form of a dedicated 
agency with sufficient expertise and capacity (e.g. staffed with certified project 
  
BALTIC COLLABORATION IN DEFENCE-RELATED R&T | Tomas Jermalavičius 
 
 
21 
managers) to manage complex requirements, risks, processes and contracts with 
suppliers. None of the Baltic states has such a national agency nor plans to create one. 
There is also no willingness to set up a common trilateral defence research, technology 
and capability development agency with associated overhead costs and the usual tussles 
for influence over it. However, if the level of ambition remains modest, as suggested 
above, no such agency would be needed. Instead, a ‘virtual’ organisation somewhat 
analogous to the NATO RTO could be constructed, with a similar ‘business model’ and a 
corresponding decision-making structure, but without a permanent administrative 
support and coordination unit. This model would best support the recommended aims 
and forms of trilateral collaboration and would offer a middle-course solution between a 
full-fledged (unnecessary and unrealistic) agency and a random set of (usually short-
lived and ineffectual) cooperation initiatives. 
36. The scheme below (see Figure 3) depicts the basic architecture of this trilateral 
collaboration effort (which could also be bilateral, should one of the states decide it has 
not much to contribute to a particular theme or has little interest in it), provisionally 
named as BaltSmartMil. The architecture is centred around a consortium of defence 
academies led by BALTDEFCOL, working to strengthen research in the ‘core competence’ 
areas of the military and linking it with research in selected technology areas where 
specialised ‘communities of practice’ (including representatives of academia and 
industry) constitute key contributors. It includes the following components. 
36.1 The existing trilateral committees (a ministerial committee; a military 
committee) issue general policy guidelines and approve resources and activities, 
planned by R&T directors and national coordinators, with inputs from military 
end-users and providers. National R&T directors and coordinators oversee their 
implementation and the utilisation of the results. 
36.2 Military end-users (most likely established specialist ‘communities of 
practice’ in particular fields) provide their expert feedback to (or fully participate 
in) the research projects run by the consortium of research centres of national 
defence academies and use project results. 
36.3 The consortium implements a policy of collaboration by running 
common projects, coordinating the work of thematic panels, arranging their 
seminars and workshops and organising a biennial defence-related R&T 
conference. 
36.4 Civilian academia and industry contribute (subject to interest and need) 
to thematic panels. They are also key participants in the biennial conference and 
in thematic seminars. 
36.5 The Baltic Defence Research and Technology Conference serves as a 
focal point of the collaboration efforts, providing a forum for knowledge sharing, 
networking, the identification of opportunities and the development of 
understanding of end-user needs. It will lead to the publishing of a regular 
publication on applied research studies conducted under the auspices of 
BaltSmartMil. 
36.6 All publications resulting from the collaboration efforts and the 
information concerning national projects of defence-related R&T and national 
experts in various S&T fields are stored in a shared and continuously updated 
database. 
36.7 Individual nations and BaltSmartMil may draw upon a common pool of 
peer reviewers to assess the scientific quality of R&T projects at their various 
stages. 
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Figure 3: A possible architecture of BaltSmartMil. 
 
37. While being very much centred on the consortium of defence academies and 
the conference, which form the cornerstones of its activities, BaltSmartMil provides a 
highly flexible mechanism for collaboration. It allows to attract researchers from outside 
the defence organisations and from military ‘communities of practice’ that are not part 
of the defence academies. Moreover, it does not commit only to trilateral 
configurations: projects conducted under its auspices could be bilateral or even 
unilateral, while the results could still be shared with others. Finally, networking and the 
exchange of ideas within this forum could lead to the definition of common trilateral (or 
bilateral) requirements by military end-users for R&T inputs, which could serve as the 
basis for inviting tenders and seeking suppliers entirely from outside this framework.  
Conclusions 
38. This policy paper attempted to explore the areas in which the Baltic states could 
cooperate in defence-related R&T and the ‘business model’ which could be applied to 
sustain this collaboration. The current status of national defence-related R&T in the 
Baltic states, their trilateral R&T cooperation record and some broader contextual 
aspects were analysed to identify the existing obstacles and possible opportunities for 
trilateral (or bilateral) collaboration between the Baltic states. The paper also sought to 
define the level of ambition which the Baltic states could aspire to in their cooperation 
efforts in this field and how to achieve it.   
39. Interviews with defence officials (defence policymakers, capability planners, 
procurement managers, educators, R&T coordinators, researchers and military subject 
matter experts in various fields) and the data, views, insights and experiences provided 
by them all point to one simple conclusion: the Baltic states are not ready for and not 
capable of collaboration in defence-related R&T in order to deliver specific new 
capabilities to their armed forces. The conceptual, political, strategic, financial, 
economic and organisational prerequisites, especially those necessary for the 
generation and management of effective common requirements, are insufficient for the 
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fulfilment of this ambition. In addition to very weak conditions on the demand ‘pull’ 
side, there are also some legal obstacles to showing a preference for trilateral projects 
by R&T suppliers if they are not owned by the national defence organisations. 
40. The defence organisations lack the required awareness, absorptive, 
transactional and administrative capacities to conduct effective defence-related R&T 
programmes even nationally, let alone on a multinational basis. On the other hand, a 
growing recognition among various defence stakeholders of those multiple weaknesses 
in the management of knowledge, technology and innovation in the defence 
organisations represents an opportunity for collaboration. This opportunity could be 
exploited if the Baltic states set capacity building for better knowledge, technology and 
innovation management in defence as their key objective and work at it together as 
much as possible. It would certainly contribute to the development of new products and 
capabilities if unreasonable expectations were dropped, if the states limited themselves 
to applied research in several key domains of R&T and if a clear focus were directed 
towards building in-house research in military affairs (strategy, operations, tactics, 
history, theory, sociology, leadership, technology, etc.). 
41. Research capabilities of the national defence academies in the Baltic states are 
of utmost importance to any ambitions to enhance internal research in the three 
defence organisations and to acquire proper knowledge-brokering hubs, necessary for 
collaboration with the civilian S&T sector and foreign partners. This will require 
sustained investments in the form of human and financial resources, together with the 
formulation of right policies and leadership guidance by the national defence authorities 
in each Baltic state. Trilateral coordination, harmonisation and eventual linking of the 
development of the internal research capabilities of the three defence organisations 
could constitute the main thrust of Baltic collaboration in defence-related R&T in the 
medium term, with BALTDEFCOL playing an active – perhaps leading – role in this effort. 
It would have a beneficial effect if a NATO ally with considerable experience in the 
development of in-house defence research capacities and, preferably, with involvement 
in BALTDEFCOL were recruited as a mentor for collaboration. 
42. Over time, common efforts devoted to increasing the ‘organisational 
brainpower’ in defence will create a demand for more practical novel solutions to 
improve military capabilities, consequently leading to joint undertakings for the 
achievement of these solutions. These undertakings will not be pursued on an ad hoc 
basis or be subject to short-termist whims of specific defence policies and plans; rather 
they will be rooted in and stemming from a broader culture of critical thinking, learning, 
experimentation and innovation in military affairs – something at which all three Baltic 
defence organisations are still woefully deficient. 
Recommendations  
43. Discard the aspiration to develop new products and entire capabilities as a level 
of ambition for trilateral R&T collaboration. Set the generation of S&T awareness and 
new knowledge of military relevance, the enhancement of technology management 
competences in defence organisations and the promotion of doctrinal and 
organisational innovativeness as the main objectives of trilateral (or bilateral) R&T 
collaboration.  
 
44. Invest in R&T capabilities of the national defence academies and link them 
through a BALTDEFCOL-led research consortium (BaltSmartMil). 
 
45. Direct the consortium: 
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45.1 to conduct research in the areas closest to central issues for the military 
profession (history, theory, doctrine, strategy, operations, tactics, organisation, 
sociology, etc.); 
 
45.2 to develop research into collaborative S&T monitoring, foresight and 
future capabilities; 
 
45.3 to facilitate research collaboration, based on military ‘communities of 
practice’, within a few R&T domains where the national excellence, interests and 
past activities of the three countries are the most aligned (at this point, human 
factors and medicine stand out as the most suitable area for trilateral 
collaboration; other fields listed in Table 2 constitute areas of potential bilateral 
cooperation); 
 
45.4 to resume the Baltic Defence Research and Technology Conference in a 
biennial  format as the consortium’s main forum where various R&T 
stakeholders meet to share their plans, ideas, knowledge and the results of R&T 
activities. 
 
46. Create a shared database for storing information about national projects, S&T 
competencies, T&E capabilities and the activities and results produced under the 
auspices of BaltSmartMil. 
 
47. Consider asking a NATO ally/an EU partner represented at BALTDEFCOL and with 
experience in the development of in-house defence R&T capacities of national 
academies to serve as a mentor for BaltSmartMil. 
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